¹ tn Here βίος (bios) refers to one’s means of subsistence – material goods or property (BDAG 177 s.v. 2).

sn Note the vivid contrast with Jesus’ example in the preceding verse: He was willing to lay down his very life, but the person in view in 3:17 is not even willing to lay down part of his material possessions for the sake of his brother.

² tn See note on the phrase “fellow Christian” in 2:9.

³ tn Here a subjective genitive, indicating God’s love for us – the love which comes from God – appears more likely because of the parallelism with “eternal life” (ζωὴν αἰώνιον, zwhn aiwnion) in 3:15, which also comes from God.

sn The love of God. The author is not saying that the person who does not love his brother cannot love God either (although this may be true enough), but rather that the person who does not love his brother shows by this failure to love that he does not have any of the love which comes from God ‘residing’ in him (the Greek verb used is μένω [menw]). Once again, conduct is the clue to paternity.

⁴ sn Once again the verb μένω (menw) is used of a spiritual reality (in this case the love of God) which does or does not reside in a person. Although the author uses the indefinite relative whoever (Grk ὃς δ᾿ ἄν, Jos d’ an), it is clear that he has the opponents in view here. This is the only specific moral fault he ever charges the opponents with in the entire letter. It is also clear that the author sees it as impossible that such a person, who refuses to offer help in his brother’s time of need (and thus ‘hates’ his brother rather than ‘loving’ him, cf. 3:15) can have any of the love which comes from God residing in him. This person, from the author’s dualistic ‘either/or’ perspective, cannot be a believer. The semantic force of the deliberative rhetorical question, “How can the love of God reside in such a person?”, is therefore a declarative statement about the spiritual condition of the opponents: “The love of God cannot possibly reside in such a person.”

⁵ sn How can the love of God reside in such a person? is a rhetorical question which clearly anticipates a negative answer: The love of God cannot reside in such a person.

⁶ tn Theoretically the pronoun ταῦτα (tauta) could refer (1) to what precedes or (2) to what follows. Since it is followed by a ἵνα (Jina) clause which gives the purpose for the writing, and a new subject is introduced in 5:14 (ἡ παρρησία, Jh parrhsia), it seems almost certain that the ταῦτα in 5:13 refers to preceding material. Even at this, some would limit the referent of ταῦτα (1) only to 5:1-12 or even 5:12, but more likely ταῦτα in 5:13 refers (2) to the entirety of the letter, for two reasons: (a) based on the structural analogy with the Gospel of John, where the conclusion refers to all that has preceded, it is probable that the conclusion to 1 John refers likewise to all that has preceded; and (b) the statement ταῦτα ἔγραψα ὑμῖν (tauta egraya Jumin) in 5:13 forms an inclusion with the statement καὶ ταῦτα γράφομεν ἡμεῖς (kai tauta grafomen Jhmei") at the end of the prologue (1:4) and encompasses the entire body of the letter.

⁷ tn The dative participle πιστεύουσιν (pisteuousin) in 5:13 is in simple apposition to the indirect object of ἔγραψα (egraya), ὑμῖν (Jumin), and could be translated, “These things I have written to you, namely, to the ones who believe in the name of the Son of God, in order that you may know.” There is an exact parallel to this structure in John 1:12, where the pronoun is αὐτοῖς (autois) and the participle is τοῖς πιστεύουσιν (toi" pisteuousin) as here.

⁸ tn This ἵνα (Jina) introduces a clause giving the author’s purpose for writing “these things” (ταῦτα, tauta), which refers to the entirety of the preceding material. The two other Johannine statements about writing, 1 John 1:4 and John 20:31, are both followed by purpose clauses introduced by ἵνα, as here.