³ sn The term money is used to translate mammon, the Aramaic term for wealth or possessions. The point is not that money is inherently evil, but that it is often misused so that it is a means of evil; see 1 Tim 6:6-10, 17-19. Here “money” is personified as a potential master and thus competes with God for the loyalty of the disciple. The passage is ultimately not a condemnation of wealth (there is no call here for absolute poverty) but a call for unqualified discipleship. God must be first, not money or possessions.

² tc If one follows the MT as it stands, it would appear that the Lord here condemns the people for their “foaming at the mouth” and then announces that judgment is inevitable. The present translation assumes that this is a continuation of the quotation of what the people say. In this case the subject of “foam at the mouth” is the Lord’s prophets. In the second line יִסַּג (yissag, a Niphal imperfect from סוּג, sug, “to remove”) is emended to יַסִּגֵנוּ (yassigenu; a Hiphil imperfect from נָסַג/נָשַׂג, nasag/nasag, “to reach; to overtake”).

² tn Heb “according to the greatness of your arm leave the sons of death.” God’s “arm” here symbolizes his strength to deliver. The verbal form הוֹתֵר (hoter) is a Hiphil imperative from יָתַר (yatar, “to remain; to be left over”). Here it must mean “to leave over; to preserve.” However, it is preferable to emend the form to הַתֵּר (hatter), a Hiphil imperative from נָתַר (natar, “be free”). The Hiphil form is used in Ps 105:20 of Pharaoh freeing Joseph from prison. The phrase “sons of death” (see also Ps 102:21) is idiomatic for those condemned to die.

¹ tc This word occurs only here. The word כִּיד (kid) was connected to Arabic kaid, “fraud, trickery,” or “warfare.” The word is emended by the commentators to other ideas, such as פִּיד (pid, “[his] calamity”). Dahood and others alter it to “cup”; Wright to “weapons.” A. F. L. Beeston argues for a meaning “condemnation” for the MT form, and so makes no change in the text (Mus 67 [1954]: 315-16). If the connection to Arabic “warfare” is sustained, or if such explanations of the existing MT can be sustained, then the text need not be emended. In any case, the sense of the line is clear.

⁴ sn In painful toil you will eat. The theme of eating is prominent throughout Gen 3. The prohibition was against eating from the tree of knowledge. The sin was in eating. The interrogation concerned the eating from the tree of knowledge. The serpent is condemned to eat the dust of the ground. The curse focuses on eating in a “measure for measure” justice. Because the man and the woman sinned by eating the forbidden fruit, God will forbid the ground to cooperate, and so it will be through painful toil that they will eat.

¹ tn The first ὅτι (hoti) in 3:20 may be understood either (1) as causal, “because if our heart condemns us,” or (2) as epexegetical (explanatory), “that if our heart condemns us.” There are two other instances of the combination ὅτι ἐάν (hoti ean) in 1 John, 3:2 and 5:14. In 3:14 the ὅτι clearly introduces an indirect discourse (content) clause following οἴδαμεν (oidamen). In 5:14 the ὅτι is epexegetical to a preceding statement (“and this is the confidence [ἡ παρρησία, hē parrēsia] which we have before him, that if we ask anything according to his will he hears us”). This is analogous to the present situation, and the subject under discussion (the believer’s confidence before God) is also similar (cf. 3:21-22). It is thus more likely, by analogy, that the first ὅτι clause in 3:20, ὅτι ἐὰν καταγινώσκῃ ἡμῶν ἡ καρδία (hoti ean kataginōskē hēmōn hē kardia), should also be understood as epexegetical to the preceding clause, ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ πείσομεν τὴν καρδίαν (emprosthen autou peisomen tēn kardian, “and we convince our heart before him”).

¹ sn Many suggestions have been offered for the puzzling expression baptized for the dead. There are up to 200 different explanations for the passage; a summary is given by K. C. Thompson, “I Corinthians 15, 29 and Baptism for the Dead,” Studia Evangelica 2.1 (TU 87), 647-59. The most likely interpretation is that some Corinthians had undergone baptism to bear witness to the faith of fellow believers who had died without experiencing that rite themselves. Paul’s reference to the practice here is neither a recommendation nor a condemnation. He simply uses it as evidence from the lives of the Corinthians themselves to bolster his larger argument, begun in 15:12, that resurrection from the dead is a present reality in Christ and a future reality for them. Whatever they may have proclaimed, the Corinthians’ actions demonstrated that they had hope for a bodily resurrection.

¹ tn Or “had him flogged,” or (traditional), “scourged him.” The verb should be read as causative. Pilate ordered Jesus to be flogged. A Roman governor would not carry out such a sentence in person. BDAG 620 s.v. μαστιγόω 1. states, “If J refers to the ‘verberatio’ given those condemned to death (TMommsen, Röm. Strafrecht 1899, 938f; Jos., Bell. 2, 308; 5, 449), it is odd that Pilate subsequently claims no cause for action (vs. 6); but if the latter statement refers only to the penalty of crucifixion, μ. vs. 1 may be equivalent to παιδεύω (q.v. 2bγ) in Lk 23:16, 22 (for μ. of a non-capital offense PFlor I, 61, 61 [85ad]=Mitt-Wilck. II/2, 80 II, 61).”

³ sn What is the meaning of Jesus’ statement “I do not judge anyone”? It is clear that Jesus did judge (even in the next verse). The point is that he didn’t practice the same kind of judgment that the Pharisees did. Their kind of judgment was condemnatory. They tried to condemn people. Jesus did not come to judge the world, but to save it (3:17). Nevertheless, and not contradictory to this, the coming of Jesus did bring judgment because it forced people to make a choice. Would they accept Jesus or reject him? Would they come to the light or shrink back into the darkness? As they responded, so were they judged—just as 3:19-21 previously stated. One’s response to Jesus determines one’s eternal destiny.

¹ sn The final condemnation will come from Moses himself—again ironic, since Moses is the very one the Jewish authorities have trusted in (placed your hope). This is again ironic if it is occurring at Pentecost, which at this time was being celebrated as the occasion of the giving of the Torah to Moses on Mt. Sinai. There is evidence that some Jews of the 1st century looked on Moses as their intercessor at the final judgment (see W. A. Meeks, The Prophet King [NovTSup], 161). This would mean the statement Moses, in whom you have placed your hope should be taken literally and relates directly to Jesus’ statements about the final judgment in John 5:28-29.

² sn In an oath one appeals to something permanent to emphasize one’s commitment to the promise. Here the Lord sarcastically swears by the arrogance of Jacob, which he earlier had condemned (6:8), something just as enduring as the Lord’s own life (see 6:8) or unchanging character (see 4:2). Other suggestions include that the Lord is swearing by the land, his most valuable possession (cf. Isa 4:2; Ps 47:4 [47:5 HT]); that this is a divine epithet analogous to “the Glory of Israel” (1 Sam 15:29); or that an ellipsis should be understood here, in which case the meaning is the same as that of 6:8 (“The Lord has sworn [by himself] against the arrogance of Jacob”).

² tn Heb “Your father, did he not eat and drink and do justice and right?” The copulative vav in front of the verbs here (all Hebrew perfects) shows that these actions are all coordinate, not sequential. The contrast drawn between the actions of Jehoiakim and Josiah show that the phrase about eating and drinking should be read in light of the same contrasts in Eccl 2, which ends with the note of contentment in Eccl 2:24 (see also Eccl 3:13; 5:18 [5:17 HT]; 8:15). The question is, of course, rhetorical, setting forth the positive role model against which Jehoiakim’s actions are to be condemned. The key phrase is, “then things went well with him,” which is repeated in the next verse after the reiteration of Josiah’s practice of justice.

² sn Previously the noun דִּין (din, judgment”) was used, signifying the legal rights or the pleas of the people. Now the imperative דִּין is used. It could be translated “judge,” but in this context “judge the poor” could be misunderstood to mean “condemn.” Here advocacy is in view, and so “plead the cause” is a better translation (cf. NASB, NIV, NRSV “defend the rights”). It was—and is—the responsibility of the king (ruler) to champion the rights of the poor and needy, who otherwise would be ignored and oppressed. They are the ones left destitute by the cruelties and inequalities of life (e.g., 2 Sam 14:4-11; 1 Kgs 3:16-28; Pss 45:3-5; 72:4; Isa 9:6-7).

³ sn The oath to testify was not an oath to tell the truth before a court of law in the modern sense. Instead it was a “curse” or “imprecation” expressed by the victim of the theft, or by the legal authorities, called down on any witness of the crime who kept silent or refused to testify (as here). According to Lev 5:1, if a witness does not speak up he is accountable for the crime. This person hears the adjuration, but if he speaks up he is condemned, and if he does not speak up he is guilty under the law. The proverb is an unusual one; it seems to be warning against getting mixed up in any way with the thief, for it will create a serious ethical dilemma.

² tn The Hebrew word translated “cursed,” a passive participle from אָרָר (ʾarar), either means “punished” or “banished,” depending on how one interprets the following preposition. If the preposition is taken as comparative, then the idea is “cursed [i.e., punished] are you above [i.e., more than] all the wild beasts.” In this case the comparative preposition reflects the earlier comparison: The serpent was more shrewd than all others, and so more cursed than all others. If the preposition is taken as separative (see the note on the word “banished” in 4:11), then the idea is “cursed and banished from all the wild beasts.” In this case the serpent is condemned to isolation from all the other animals.

¹ tn Once again there is the problem of deciding whether the phrase ἐν τούτῳ (en toutō) refers (1) to what precedes or (2) to what follows. When an explanatory or epexegetical ὅτι (hoti) clause follows, and the ὅτι clause is not grammatically unrelated to the phrase ἐν τούτῳ, then the ἐν τούτῳ is best understood as referring to what follows. Here in 3:19-20 there are no less than three ὅτι clauses that follow, one in 3:19 and two in 3:20, and thus there is the difficulty of trying to determine whether any one of them is related to the ἐν τούτῳ phrase in 3:19. It is relatively easy to eliminate the first ὅτι clause (in 3:19) from consideration because it is related not to ἐν τούτῳ but to the verb γνωσόμεθα (gnōsometha) as an indirect discourse clause giving the content of what believers know (“that we are of the truth”). As far as the two ὅτι clauses in 3:20 are concerned, it is difficult to see how believers could know that they belong to the truth (19a) by means of either, since the first speaks of a situation where they are under self-condemnation (“if our heart condemns us…”) and the second ὅτι clause seems to give a further explanation related to the first (“that God is greater than our heart…”). Therefore it seems better to understand the phrase ἐν τούτῳ in 3:19 as referring to the preceding context, and this makes perfectly good sense because 3:18 concludes with a reference to the righteous deeds with which believers are to love one another, which are produced by the truth.

³ tn The use of two ὅτι (hoti) clauses in close succession is somewhat awkward, but this is nothing new for the author; and indeed he has twice previously used two ὅτι clauses in close proximity in 3:2 and 14. In both those instances the second ὅτι was understood as causal, and (1) some interpreters would do the same here. Unless one understands both of the ὅτι clauses in 3:20 as causal, however (an option rejected based on the analogy with 5:14, see the discussion in the note on “that” at the beginning of the present verse), the first ὅτι clause must be understood as parenthetical in order for the second to be causal. This results in an even more awkward construction. It seems most probable that (2) the second ὅτι clause in 3:20 should also be understood as epexegetical (explanatory), and resumptive to the first. The resultant meaning is as follows: “and we convince our heart before him, that if our heart condemns us, that God is greater than our heart and knows all things.”

¹ sn Here then is the main point of the ark of the covenant, and the main point of all worship—meeting with God through atonement. The text makes it clear that here God would meet with Moses (“you” is singular) and then he would speak to the people—he is the mediator of the covenant. S. R. Driver (Exodus, 272) makes the point that the verb here is not the word that means “to meet by chance” (as in Exod 3:18), but “to meet” by appointment for a purpose (וְנוֹעַדְתִּי, v^enoʿadti). The parallel in the NT is Jesus Christ and his work. The theology is that the Law condemns people as guilty of sin, but the sacrifice of Christ makes atonement. So he is the “place of propitiation” (Rom 3:25) who gains communion with the Father for sinners. A major point that could be made from this section is this: At the center of worship must be the atoning work of Christ—a perpetual reminder of God’s righteous standard (the testimony in the ark) and God’s gracious provision (the atonement lid).

³ tn Grk “strange flesh.” This phrase has been variously interpreted. It could refer to flesh of another species (such as angels lusting after human flesh). This would aptly describe the sin of the angels, but not easily explain the sin of Sodom and Gomorrah. It could refer to the homosexual practices of the Sodomites, but a difficulty arises from the use of ἕτερος (heteros; “strange,” “other”). When this is to be distinguished from ἄλλος (allos, “another”) it suggests “another of a different kind.” If so, would that properly describe homosexual behavior? In response, the language could easily be compact: “pursued flesh other than what was normally pursued.” However, would this find an analogy in the lust of angels (such would imply that angels normally had sexual relations of some sort, but cf. Matt 22:30)? Another alternative is that the focus of the parallel is on the activity of the surrounding cities and the activity of the angels. This is especially plausible since the participles ἐκπορνεύσασαι (ekporneusasai, “having indulged in sexual immorality”) and ἀπελθοῦσαι (apelthousai, “having pursued”) have concord with “cities” (πόλεις, poleis), a feminine plural noun, rather than with Sodom and Gomorrah (both masculine nouns). If so, then their sin would not necessarily have to be homosexuality. However, most likely the feminine participles are used because of constructio ad sensum (construction according to sense). That is, since both Sodom and Gomorrah are cities, the feminine is used to imply that all the cities are involved. The connection with angels thus seems to be somewhat loose: Both angels and Sodom and Gomorrah indulged in heinous sexual immorality. Thus, whether the false teachers indulge in homosexual activity is not the point; mere sexual immorality is enough to condemn them.

³ tn Further difficulties are created by the meaning of καρδία (kardia) in 3:19. Although it may be agreed that the term generally refers to the “center and source of the whole inner life, w. its thinking, feeling, and volition” (BDAG 508 s.v. l.b), this may be further subdivided into references to (a) “the faculty of thought…as the organ of natural and spiritual enlightenment,” that is, the mind; (b) “the will and its decisions”; (c) “the emotions, wishes, desires,” i.e., the emotions or feelings; or (d) “moral decisions, the moral life,” that is, the part of the individual where moral decisions are made, which is commonly called the conscience. Thus καρδία in 3:19 could refer to either the mind, the will, the emotions, or the conscience, and it is not transparently clear which concept the author has primarily in view. In light of the overall context, which seems to discuss the believer’s assurance of his or her standing before God (ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ [emprosthen autou] in 3:19 and the mention of παρρησία [parrēsia, “boldness” or “confidence”] in 3:21) it seems probable that the conscience, that aspect of one’s καρδία which involves moral choices and the guilt or approval for having made them, is primarily in view here. Thus the meaning “convince” is preferred for the verb πείθω (peithō), since the overall subject seems to be the believer’s assurance of his or her standing before God, especially in the case when (v. 20) the believer’s conscience attempts to condemn him on account of sin.